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INTRODUCTION 
The book, The Unitary Executive:  Presidential Power from Washington 
to Bush,1 is one of a kind.  I am proud to have been a part of the Sym-
posium at which Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo initiated their 
systematic study of the history of the unitary theory of the executive 
that has culminated in the publication of this important, new book.2  
They have each been at the forefront, for more than decade, in illu-
minating the unitary theory of the executive—a theory that posits 
that the Constitution should be construed as vesting in the person of 
the President the complete control of the exercise of all executive 
power.  The Unitary Executive stands alone as the only constitutional 
and political history of the ways in which each President from George 
Washington to George W. Bush implemented or exercised power 
upon the basis of the unitary theory of the executive.  It is no over-
statement to say that Chris Yoo and Steve Calabresi have done more 
than any other scholars to refine our understanding of the unitary 
theory of the executive.  If there is an instance, prior to 2005, of a 
President’s acting on the basis of the unitary theory of the executive, 
it is in this book. 
But, my purpose in joining this Symposium is not simply to praise 
Chris and Steve for their outstanding work.  My focus is less on what 
they discuss in their excellent book than on what is not discussed.  To 
their credit, Calabresi and Yoo acknowledge that different Presidents 
have expressed varying degrees of commitment to the unitary theory 
of the executive.  Nevertheless, their account is not, nor does it pur-
 
 * Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of the UNC Cen-
ter on Law and Government, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law, 
B.A. Yale University, M.Sc. London School of Economics, J.D. University of Chicago.  I am 
very grateful to Alicia Kerr and Tristan Routh, members of the UNC Class of 2011, for 
their excellent research assistance. 
 1 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
 2 See Symposium, Presidential Power in the Twenty-First Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L REV. 1213 
(1997). 
426 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
port to be, a comprehensive survey of the interaction among the 
branches pertaining to the scope of presidential power.  The overrid-
ing, singular focus of their book risks leading its readers to overesti-
mate the extent to which the unitary theory of the executive has actu-
ally been implemented or followed in American history.  
Consequently, the book has the same strengths—and limitations, I 
dare say—of a book on congressional power that primarily focused 
on the instances in which Congress has claimed the primacy of its au-
thority in particular realms of constitutional authority or of a book on 
judicial supremacy that focused primarily on the instances in which 
the Court struck down legislative or executive actions.  I suspect that 
Steve and Chris would agree that these other books might have lim-
ited utility in elucidating the general scope of their respective sub-
jects.  I fear their book might be vulnerable to a similar critique:  its 
limitations arise from its focus.  It is a theory in search of a proof, and 
thus the book does not pause to consider all the times that Presidents 
did not follow, or the judiciary or Congress rejected, the unitary the-
ory of the executive.  While Professors Calabresi and Yoo presumably 
set forth all the possible support they have found within historical 
practices for the unitary theory of the executive, the readers of their 
book will have to look elsewhere for a more comprehensive analysis 
of how often (or rarely) this theory has been endorsed or imple-
mented as compared to other conceptions of presidential or execu-
tive power.  No doubt, their study will help us better understand 
presidential power and particularly the unitary theory of the execu-
tive; however, the understanding of presidential power cannot be 
based on this book or its account alone.  To put this point slightly dif-
ferently, the overriding concern of The Unitary Executive is departmen-
talism—“the notion that all three branches of the federal government 
are coequal interpreters of the Constitution”3—but it is departmenta-
lism almost entirely from the perspective of only the President.  Their 
spotlight on departmentalism is primarily focused on one end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue, even though comprehension of departmenta-
lism, even as they have defined it, requires a bigger spotlight.  To ap-
preciate departmentalism in constitutional law we need a broader 
perspective, a more complete account, of presidential power. 
The unitary theory of the executive has not been conceived or 
forged in a vacuum; it is a function, like every aspect of checks and 
balances, of the interaction of all three branches.  The departments 
are shaped by and shape each other through their interaction—the 
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Feb. 2010] DEMISE OF THE WHIG PRESIDENCY 427 
 
confluence of their efforts to govern the internal operations and de-
cision making of themselves and to extend the boundaries or fend off 
encroachments from other constitutional authorities upon the boun-
daries of their respective powers.  Departmentalism is shaped by the 
exercise of coordinate powers not only at particular times or periods 
but also over time.  As demonstrated in their book, Professors Cala-
bresi and Yoo recognize the need to demonstrate how this theory has 
fared in practice.  But, a complete, positive account of this theory re-
quires knowing more than they tell us; it ultimately requires knowing 
how all the different theories of presidential power have fared in 
practice and thus entails an analysis of all the times that the unitary 
theory of the executive was not followed and what alternative concep-
tions of presidential power were embraced instead. 
In light of what I consider to be the importance of a more de-
tailed analysis of the evolution of presidential power over time, my 
Essay consists of three Parts.  In Part I, I discuss three concepts that I 
suggest are basic for illuminating the development of presidential 
power over time.  The first of these is departmentalism, whose signifi-
cance the authors clearly recognize.  The second is constitutional 
construction, which is the dynamic process through which non-
judicial branches influence or shape constitutional practices and un-
derstandings.4  If the unitary theory of the executive is to be imple-
mented or established at all or when departments each assert or try to 
protect their particular prerogatives, it will be through this process; 
however, this process is a dynamic one in which powers are shaped 
not in a vacuum but rather through the give and take—the interac-
tion—among the political branches.  To appreciate how the unitary 
theory of the executive has fared in practice, we need to appreciate 
how the interaction between the branches and among Presidents has 
shaped the understanding of executive power over time.  The third 
concept essential to the understanding of departmentalism, constitu-
tional construction, and the development of presidential power, is 
non-judicial precedent.5  By the latter, I mean the past constitutional 
decisions or acts of non-judicial actors that public authorities seek, 
for whatever reason, to invest with normative authority.  Constitu-
tional construction produces non-judicial precedents, and presiden-
 
 4 For perhaps the best work on constitutional construction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
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tial powers develop through the accretion of non-judicial precedents.  
In fact, the Court has been peripheral by and large on questions re-
garding separation of powers over the years.  Judicial review will only 
tell us a little about the constitutional foundations of the unitary the-
ory of the executive, while non-judicial precedent will tell us more. 
Part II is a case study of the demise of the Whig conception of the 
presidency—the notion that the President should be subservient to 
the will of Congress on all domestic policymaking.6  Professors Cala-
bresi and Yoo talk about each of the Presidents who helped to bury 
the Whig conception of the presidency,7 but the case study provides a 
more detailed examination of departmentalism at work in an impor-
tant, twelve year period of American history. 
In the third and final Part, I consider more fully several lessons 
that can be derived from the case study in Part II.  First, it shows how 
the Constitution actually matters.  Contrary to the suggestion of many 
scholars (particularly those who focus on courts), the case study 
shows how several people who became President acted contrary to 
their political and even their self-interest once they took office.  Sec-
ond, the case study contradicts the conventional wisdom that, prior to 
the Civil War, the only Presidents who strongly defended, or asserted, 
presidential prerogatives from the 1820s to 1861 were Andrew Jack-
son and James Polk.  In fact, this is wrong; the demise of the Whig 
conception of the presidency shows us that several other Presidents in 
the Antebellum era actually followed Jackson’s and Polk’s model of 
the presidency rather than the competing one advanced by the Whig 
Party.  The fact that Presidents were unpopular or did not achieve all 
they wanted to achieve does not mean they were weak chief execu-
tives.  Third, the case study underscores the significance of constitu-
tional decision making outside the Court.  The Whig conception of 
the presidency died as a result of the interaction of the political 
branches and without the involvement of the Court at all.  It is thus, 
at the very least, a cautionary tale against overestimating the rele-
vance of judicial review to the development of executive or legislative 
power over time.  Fourth, the case study underscores the importance 
of the dynamic relationship between the Congress and the President 
in burying this notion of the presidency and in influencing the un-
derstandings and exercise of executive power.  The case study shows 
how Congress pushed back almost every single time that the four 
 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 130–38, 144–51 (detailing the continuation of the 
unitary executive through the presidencies of William Henry Harrison, John Tyler, Zach-
ary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore). 
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nominally Whig Presidents tried to advance their notions of the 
presidency in opposition to the dominant thinking in Congress.  
Presidential power advanced in those years, but so too did congres-
sional power.  Fifth, the case study is a reminder of the importance of 
not confusing a defense of presidential prerogatives with the unitary 
theory of the executive.  Fuller accounts of departmentalism show 
that even as these Presidents were rebelling against the Whig concep-
tion of the presidency they were not seeking to implement the uni-
tary theory of the executive.  Last but not least, there are two norma-
tive consequences to my case study.  The first is the practical 
impossibility of judicial supremacy; judicial supremacy is not a fact of 
constitutional life, nor has it ever been.  The fact is that presidential 
power has largely developed on the basis of non-judicial precedent to 
which the courts generally defer.  The second is that the unitary the-
ory of the executive will never be fully implemented.  This theory has 
never been fully implemented because it is in tension with substantial 
numbers of judicial and non-judicial precedents.  Indeed, it could 
only be implemented if there were a complete abdication of congres-
sional authority.  If past is prologue, presidential power has never 
grown without the acquiescence or assistance of the Congress, and 
Congress has never abdicated so much of its authority as to allow full 
and complete presidential control of all executive action to take root 
in our constitutional order. 
I.  SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
In this Part, I discuss the significance of three concepts to under-
standing the development of presidential power.  These concepts are 
departmentalism, constitutional construction, and non-judicial 
precedent.  It is not a problem for The Unitary Executive that it only 
discusses the first of these, at least explicitly.  The constitutional 
scheme of checks and balances does not depend on the players think-
ing of, or knowing about, these concepts, though they might help to 
illuminate how this scheme works over time. 
A.  Departmentalism 
The concept of departmentalism is at the heart of The Unitary Ex-
ecutive.  The concept refers to the efforts of each branch to claim and 
to act upon the unilateral authority to interpret the Constitution.  
There is no question that, as The Unitary Executive suggests, depart-
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mentalism has long been an undeniable fact of constitutional life in 
the United States.8 
To appreciate departmentalism, two clarifications, beyond those 
made in The Unitary Executive, are helpful.  First, Calabresi and Yoo 
treat departmentalism as synonymous with “coordinate constitutional 
interpretation,”9 but it is important to know coordinate constitutional 
interpretation with respect to what.  Not all coordinate constitutional 
interpretation is the same, even as a descriptive matter; different in-
terpretations have different effects, and different interpretations may 
be advanced with greater intensity and success.  When, for instance, 
Congress makes rules for its internal governance, it is acting upon a 
unilateral interpretation of the Constitution and, at the same time, 
helping to shape how it, as a department, looks.  But, when Congress 
passes a law that seeks to strip the federal courts of virtually any juris-
diction over claims that might be raised against the conditions under 
which the American military, pursuant to presidential or congres-
sional directives, may detain—or hold in custody—citizens or non-
citizens,10 departmentalism hardly seems to capture all that is going 
on.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court might be protecting its 
own unilateral authority by striking down the law.  But, on the other 
hand, the Court might be protecting individual rights from being vio-
lated by the other branches.  The difficulty is that the term depart-
mentalism seems to insufficiently capture the nature and complexity 
of the constitutional interaction among the branches.  The shapes of 
each department turn on at least some decisions of the authorities in 
all three branches, and while there are many instances in which the 
leaders of a branch are in agreement over the scope of their respec-
tive powers, they are not in agreement on everything.  Recall, for ex-
ample, the fundamentally different notions that Theodore Roosevelt 
and his successor William Howard Taft had of the presidency—
Roosevelt construed all the gaps and ambiguities of the constitutional 
text in favor of presidential power while Taft took exactly the oppo-
site position of restricting presidential authority solely to the express 
grants of power vested in the office in the Constitution.11  The possi-
bilities of different leaders of the branches favoring different concep-
 
 8 See id. at 23 (referencing the acknowledgement of departmentalism in Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1807)). 
 9 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 23. 
 10 Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (striking down the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 as an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus). 
 11 See generally PAOLO E. COLETTA, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 11–12, 16 
(1973) (contrasting Roosevelt’s and Taft’s conceptions of the presidency). 
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tions of their own powers as well as that of the other branches indi-
cate the limitations of the descriptive power of departmentalism, 
standing alone or without further elaboration. 
B.  Constitutional Construction 
A second concept that can help to clarify departmentalism in our 
constitutional order is constitutional construction.  Political scientist 
Keith Whittington has given the most extensive explanation of the 
utility of the conception of constitutional construction.12  According 
to Whittington, this concept captures the differences in how the po-
litical branches and the Supreme Court make constitutional law:  in 
deciding the constitutional cases or controversies that come before it, 
the Court will have its chance to expound upon the meaning of the 
Constitution, but the political branches have opportunities as well, 
with the critical difference being that their decisions and the circum-
stances in which they make them are infused with political considera-
tions.13  While the Justices are heavily discouraged, to say the least, 
from taking any political considerations into account in interpreting 
the Constitution, national political leaders are not.  The point of con-
stitutional construction is that Presidents and members of Congress 
make decisions or take actions with discernible constitutional ramifi-
cations apart from the fact that they are infused with politics.  The 
political costs, benefits, incentives, or disincentives that particular 
Presidents or members of Congress might have had in time should 
not obscure the constitutional ramifications or significance of their 
decisions.  Constitutional construction is a dynamic process in which 
the meaning of the Constitution can be and often is shaped as a re-
sult of, or through, the interaction of national political leaders on 
questions of constitutional meaning or consequence. 
Obviously, constitutional construction is hardly the exclusive prov-
ince of Congress.  As Whittington notes, the Johnson impeachment 
trial had constitutional ramifications for both Congress and the Pres-
ident:  it demonstrated the limits of using the impeachment and trial 
authorities of the Congress to remove a President based on his differ-
ences of opinion over the constitutionality of laws that he had ve-
 
 12 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 13 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 4, at 1–19 (explaining the difference between jurispruden-
tial interpretation and constitutional construction done by other governmental actors in 
an effort to assert power). 
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toed.14  But, Johnson’s acquittal also effectively ratified the authority 
of the President to veto legislation on whatever ground he deemed 
appropriate, even one that was deplorable to the Congress.  In addi-
tion, the Senate’s acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase, which occurred 
several decades before Johnson’s acquittal, had its own constitutional 
consequences, perhaps most importantly recognizing the limits of 
congressional authority to impeach and remove a Supreme Court jus-
tice on the basis of some of his decisions.15 
The concept of constitutional construction reminds us that de-
partments take their shape in pushing against and in being pushed 
against by the other branches.  Indeed, the Chase and Johnson im-
peachment trials illustrate how this interaction is not strictly confined 
to the particular powers of each department to govern themselves.  
The constitutional consequences of presidential-congressional inter-
action are not found or defined in forms as neat and as easily read-
able as judicial opinions, but they are evident nonetheless.  Indeed, 
they are most evident in the form of non-judicial precedent. 
C.  Non-Judicial Precedent 
In both a recently published book and law review article, I exam-
ined at length the constitutional significance of non-judicial prece-
dent.16  I will not reiterate here the arguments made in those works, 
but instead will review a few of the distinctive features of non-judicial 
precedent and their ramifications for developing a positive account 
of the scheme of checks and balances at work. 
One of the most important contributions made by Calabresi and 
Yoo is to underscore the importance of constitutional activity outside 
the courts.  Indeed, it is even more extensive than they suggest:  the 
Constitution explicitly vests Congress with seventy-five powers, the 
President with fourteen, and the Vice President with five.17  Some of 
these are familiar to most people, while many of them are not.  Nev-
ertheless, they are all deployed, and in almost every instance in which 
they are being deployed these actors make judgments that either they 
 
 14 Id. at 113–57 (detailing the impeachment of Johnson and the outcomes which included a 
reaffirmation of the limits of the impeachment power coupled with the failure of Johnson 
to expand presidential authority). 
 15 See id. at 20–71 (recounting the failure of the impeachment trial of Justice Chase which, 
though the Justice was not without faults, was basically a partisan battle over political 
principles). 
 16 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 17 Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 5, at 743. 
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or their successors have seen fit to try to invest with normative author-
ity as precedents. 
Moreover, most of these precedents are final or at least not over-
turned by the courts.  To begin with, the Supreme Court may not 
take cases in which the lower courts have upheld non-judicial consti-
tutional activity.18  Second, in most constitutional cases, the Court 
employs either deferential judicial review or defers to non-judicial 
precedents in such varied forms as historical practices, traditions, cus-
toms, and norms.19  Third, the Court’s standing and political question 
doctrines have precluded many areas of non-judicial constitutional 
decision making.20  Fourth, the courts uphold the vast majority of 
non-judicial constitutional decisions that they review.21 
It is rare but admittedly not unprecedented for the Court to strike 
down presidential or congressional constitutional decisions.  On 
these rare occasions,22 the presidential activity appears to directly 
threaten the courts or Congress, and the courts are (perceived at 
least) on the same side of the issue.  Last but not least, there remain 
vast areas of constitutional decision making that have never been and 
are likely never to be subjected to searching judicial review.23  Each 
department of the federal government has, in other words, extensive 
responsibilities and powers that are not going to be influenced by or 
even end up in a court of law. 
Perhaps the most important ramification of these distinctive fea-
tures of non-judicial precedents for the present Symposium is that 
they ought to dissuade us from giving into the temptation of looking 
to the courts for guidance or vindication of the unitary theory of the 
executive.  Judicial review has often been peripheral, if not irrelevant, 
to the analysis of the unitary theory of the executive.  To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has in a few cases addressed the theory or arguments 
related to it—but only a few.24  The significance of these decisions 
should not be overstated, particularly when we recognize that both 
Presidents and members of Congress have confronted this theory—or 
 
 18 Id. at 745–46. 
 19 Id. at 748–49 (listing examples of the Court deferring to each of these non-judicial prece-
dents). 
 20 Id. at 747–48 (giving examples such as the Court overturning a Ninth Circuit decision 
regarding the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance based on standing). 
 21 Id. at 746. 
 22 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down a 
decision of the President that was not within his vast constitutional authority). 
 23 See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 5, at 751. 
 24 See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 192, 419 (discussing inconsistent treatment of 
the unitary executive by the Supreme Court in two landmark cases). 
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arguments related to it—on more occasions than the Court has.  We 
need to look outside the courts to the constitutional decisions and 
practices of the other branches as they relate to presidential power.  
We need to look, in other words, at the non-judicial precedents on 
presidential power, particularly the unitary theory of the executive.  
Hence, in the next Part, I turn to a closer look at an important series 
of constitutional decisions made by Presidents and members of Con-
gress over the course of twelve years on the critical question of 
whether the President should be subservient to the will of Congress 
on all matters of domestic policymaking. 
II.  THE DEMISE OF THE WHIG PRESIDENCY 
In this Part, I examine the remarkably short life of the Whig con-
ception of the presidency.  This conception had been a fundamental 
tenet of the Whig Party, which had been formed in opposition to 
what its leaders believed was the usurpation of legislative power by 
President Andrew Jackson.  The name of the party was no accident; it 
was taken to underscore its connection to the old, British “Whig” tra-
dition that had heavily influenced the thinking of many of the leaders 
of the American Revolution and that followed the republican ideal of 
placing “the general good ahead of private interests.”25  No doubt, 
another purpose of the party was to be a platform for Henry Clay, its 
most prominent founder, to mount a successful run for the presi-
dency.  In spite of Clay’s popularity and the venerable tradition on 
which the American Whig Party was based, it did not last long, and 
the Whig conception of the presidency never took hold.  Its demise 
illustrates how departmentalism is a function of constitutional con-
struction and non-judicial precedents, including those made by 
Presidents who were not very memorable. 
A.  William Henry Harrison 
Although William Henry Harrison was President for only four 
weeks, his presidency was not constitutionally insignificant.  If one 
looks at what he did (and the reactions to his decisions) in the six-
month period between his election and his death, his presidency is 
significant at the very least because of the significant blows he struck 
against the Whig conception of the presidency. 
 
 25 MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:  JACKSONIAN 
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 3 (1999). 
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Since Harrison was the first Whig to be elected President, the na-
tion and, particularly, the leadership of his party expected at least two 
things of him.  The first was that he would not usurp legislative power 
or act as tyrannically as Whigs believed Jackson and his successor, 
Martin Van Buren, had done.  The second was that he would be 
committed to legislative supremacy, particularly in domestic policy-
making.  The Whigs conceived the President as a weak minister 
whose principal responsibility was to submit to the will of the legisla-
ture. 
But Harrison was not fully committed to either of these things.  
Indeed, his first blow against the Whig conception of the presidency 
was his steadfast refusal to accede to the demands of the leader of the 
Whig Party, Henry Clay.  Over the course of six meetings that oc-
curred between Harrison and Henry Clay, his Party’s leader in Con-
gress, Clay pressed Harrison in vain to accede to his leadership in 
shaping the administration and domestic policy; and Harrison had to 
remind Clay more than once that “you forget that I am President.”26  
In the aftermath of their final meeting, which was held shortly after 
the inauguration, Harrison exploded at Clay’s impertinence after 
Clay had sent him a letter with a proclamation directing Harrison to 
call a special session of Congress to address the nation’s failing econ-
omy.27  After the exchange, Clay left Washington in disgust, and so 
two weeks into his presidency, William Henry Harrison, the nation’s 
first Whig President, was not speaking to the Whig leader in Con-
gress.  They were not speaking because Harrison had refused to fol-
low Clay’s dictates on the organization and the priorities of his ad-
ministration. 
Harrison’s second blow to the Whig conception of the presidency 
was his rejection of the Whig Party’s opposition to the principle of ro-
tation in office of removing the political appointees of the prior ad-
ministration and replacing them with loyal partisans.  Six of Harri-
son’s predecessors had staunchly opposed the practice—George 
Washington (in his second term), John Adams, James Madison, James 
Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren, while only two 
of Harrison’s predecessors—Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson—
 
 26 MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE:  WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN 299 
(1987); see also GEORGE RAWLINGS POAGE, HENRY CLAY AND THE WHIG PARTY 16–17 (re-
print 1965) (1938) (discussing the tact with which Harrison handled Clay’s suggestions 
regarding potential members of his Cabinet); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE LIFE OF 
HENRY CLAY 338–39 (1937) (discussing Clay’s desperate attempts to influence Harrison’s 
Cabinet appointments and Harrison’s touchiness on the subject). 
 27 See NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON & JOHN 
TYLER 38 (1989). 
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had actually embraced it.28  Although he was the standard bearer of 
the party that opposed Jackson’s implementation of the spoils system, 
Harrison compiled a mixed record in keeping the pledge he had 
made as the Whig candidate not to replace people solely for partisan 
reasons.  On the one hand, he vowed to reform “the spoils system and 
opposed the wholesale removal of Democrats without cause.”29  
Moreover, Harrison’s Cabinet included Daniel Webster and Thomas 
Ewing, both of whom had opposed the practice of rotation of office 
when they were in the Senate.30  Harrison requested reports detailing 
the activities and responsibilities of every office and “vowed to protect 
officeholders who were performing their duties well.”31  On the other 
hand, the pressure from Whig leaders to remove Democrats to make 
way for their friends was enormous, and Harrison’s Cabinet voted to 
make an extensive purge of Democrats.  Postmaster General Francis 
Granger probably had the highest numbers of dismissals:  as one his-
torian found, Granger, during his six months in office, had removed  
39 of the 133 presidential postmasters, and by September 1841 almost 2,500 
postmasters had been appointed in the lesser offices to vacancies most of 
which were caused by removals.  Granger later boasted that that he had re-
moved 1,700 postmasters and had he remained [in the Cabinet] two or three 
weeks longer, would have removed 3,000 more.32 
Harrison’s final blow against the Whig conception was the way in 
which he used his Cabinet.  The Constitution provides that a Presi-
dent “may require the [o]pinion, in writing, of the principal [o]fficer 
in each of the executive [d]epartments, upon any [s]ubject relating 
to the [d]uties of their respective [o]ffices.”33  While Thomas Jeffer-
son had construed this language as allowing his Cabinet to vote on 
the most important matters confronting the administration and vest-
ing in him the power to overrule their decisions if he saw fit,34 the 
seven other Presidents who preceded Harrison did not believe the 
Cabinet had any authority to bind them and differed only to the ex-
 
 28 See generally LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS:  A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
1829–1861, at 300–46 (1954). 
 29 PETERSON, supra note 27, at 39. 
 30 WHITE, supra note 28, at 310 (describing Webster’s and Ewing’s opposition to rotation 
during the debate of 1835). 
 31 PETERSON, supra note 27, at 39. 
 32 WHITE, supra note 28, at 311. 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 34 See 2 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME:  JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 269–
79 (1951) (discussing Jefferson’s delegation of duties to different departments). 
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tent to which they consulted their respective Cabinets.35  Nevertheless, 
the six members of Harrison’s Cabinet believed in the Whig ortho-
doxy that they should guide and direct all of the President’s actions.  
This belief derived from the Whigs’ conception that the presidency 
should be subservient not just to Congress but to the Cabinet, which 
existed, in their view, as an important check on executive usurpation 
of legislative authority.36  While Harrison’s Cabinet allowed him to 
preside over their meetings, they dictated that decisions should be 
made by majority rule, with each cabinet member having a single vote 
and allowing Harrison to cast a tie-breaking vote if the Cabinet was 
deadlocked.37 
Though Harrison initially followed his Cabinet’s preferred me-
thod of decision making, he began to disagree.  The most dramatic 
confrontation arose when Webster informed Harrison that the Cabi-
net had decided to reject his preferred candidate and instead to ap-
point James Wilson as the Governor of Iowa.  After a prolonged si-
lence, Harrison wrote a few words on a slip of paper which he asked 
Webster to read to the Cabinet.  The message was succinct:  “William 
Henry Harrison, President of the United States.”38  Harrison then 
rose to his feet and angrily told the Cabinet: “William Henry Harri-
son, President of the United States, tells you, gentlemen, that by ____, 
John Chambers shall be Governor of Iowa.”39  The aggregation and 
consistent pattern of Harrison’s protestations against being pressured 
into following the Whig conception of the presidency leads to the 
conclusion that once in office (and freed from the need to run for re-
election), Harrison seems to have recognized the need to protect the 
prerogatives and institutional needs of the presidency.  His rebukes 
reflect his growing resistance to the Whig conception of the presi-
dency. 
B.  John Tyler 
Initially, Whig leaders hoped that Harrison’s Vice President and 
successor in office, John Tyler, would not be as resistant as Harrison 
had become to the Whig conception of the presidency.  Tyler had left 
 
 35 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 28, at 93 (discussing the tendency of some Presidents to de-
pend heavily on the Cabinet). 
 36 PETERSON, supra note 27, at 40 (describing the Whig strategy of appointing a Cabinet to 
direct the President in order to eliminate executive usurpation). 
 37 See WHITE, supra note 28, at 93 (explaining that Harrison’s heavy dependence on his 
Cabinet led to the Cabinet’s exercising of authority for him). 
 38 Recollections of an Old Stager, HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG., June-Nov. 1873, at 753, 754. 
 39 PETERSON, supra note 27, at 41 (underscored omission in original). 
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the Democratic Party to protest Andrew Jackson’s usurpation and 
consolidation of executive power and voted to censure Jackson in 
1834.40  Whig leaders did not believe Tyler would have the temerity to 
challenge their orthodoxy in light of his longstanding friendship with 
Clay, his having not been elected President in his own right, and his 
being the youngest person up until that time to serve as President. 
But, Whig leaders failed to appreciate Tyler’s longstanding fidelity 
to the principles of the Democratic Party, including his support for 
Jackson’s election in 1828 and reelection in 1832.  Indeed, the first 
thing Tyler did, upon learning of Harrison’s death, was to reject the 
Whig position on his status.  Although the Whigs, including those in 
his Cabinet, believed that the powers but not the office of the presi-
dency had devolved upon Tyler, Tyler informed the six members of 
the Cabinet in his first meeting with them and then the nation in a 
short address41 afterwards that he construed the Constitution as au-
thorizing the Vice President to succeed automatically to the office of 
the presidency upon the President’s death.  In spite of the fact that 
the Whigs controlled the Congress, the House and the Senate, each 
with a few dissenters, quickly approved of Tyler’s reading of the Con-
stitution in separate resolutions.42 
Second, John Tyler broke dramatically with Whig orthodoxy with 
his exercises of the President’s veto authority.  Whig leaders had long 
 
 40 For a recent, thorough biography of John Tyler, see EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER:  
THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT (2006). 
 41 President John Tyler, Inaugural Address (April 9, 1841), in 4 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 36 (1897) 
(delivering his inaugural address upon assuming office). 
 42 The pertinent constitutional language was ambiguous:  “In Case of the Removal of the 
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers 
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Con-
gress . . . [shall declare] what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall 
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  The question was whether “the same” refers to the office or the 
presidency’s powers and duties.  Prominent authorities had divided over whether “the 
same” meant that a Vice President should automatically become President in his own 
right and continue therein until the expiration of the term, or that a Vice President could 
only act as President upon a sitting President’s death and had no entitlement to claim the 
office for himself since he had not been formally elected President.  Tyler opted for the 
first reading, while Whig leaders opted for the latter.  The seven other Vice Presidents 
who succeeded to the presidency are Millard Fillmore (1850), Andrew Johnson (1865), 
Chester Arthur (1881), Theodore Roosevelt (1901), Calvin Coolidge (1923), Harry Tru-
man (1945), and Lyndon Johnson (1963).  The repetition reinforced Tyler’s succession 
as a significant constitutional precedent.  In 1967, Tyler’s precedent was officially codified 
with the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  In the only application of this 
Amendment, Gerald Ford became President when Richard Nixon resigned from office in 
1974. 
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objected to both vetoes and pocket vetoes, claiming that the former 
should be restricted only to bills that were plainly unconstitutional 
and the latter were just plainly unconstitutional.43  Whigs believed 
that a President was constitutionally obliged to sign a bill or to veto it 
and that exercising vetoes on the basis of a President’s own, separate 
constitutional constructions, as Jackson had done, was nothing more 
than an illegitimate usurpation of legislative authority.  Nevertheless, 
Tyler cast six vetoes—the largest number cast by any antebellum Pres-
ident, including Jackson;44 and his four pocket vetoes were the second 
most cast by an antebellum President.  But, the constitutional signifi-
cance of Tyler’s vetoes depends less on their number than on the fact 
that he claimed a broad basis for them, including constitutional, pol-
icy, and even moral objections to the legislation he was vetoing.45  In 
exercising vetoes on whatever grounds he deemed appropriate, Tyler 
was following Jackson’s example rather than the Whig orthodoxy that 
the veto only be used on plainly unconstitutional legislation. 
Third, Tyler rejected the Whig orthodoxy on the role of the Cabi-
net.  In his first meeting with his Cabinet, Tyler not only rejected its 
view on presidential succession but also its entitlement to make deci-
sions for the administration based on a majority vote.  Tyler immedi-
ately objected that he did not believe that cabinet members were co-
equal with the President and that 
I can never consent to being dictated to act as to what I shall or shall not 
do.  I, as President, shall be responsible for my administration.  I hope to 
have your hearty co-operation in carrying out its measures.  So long as 
you see fit to do this, I shall be glad to have you with me.  When you 
think otherwise, your resignations will be accepted.46 
 
 43 See generally WHITE, supra note 28, at 30–33 (describing the Whigs’ criticism of the veto 
power). 
 44 See 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 63 (relaying President John Tyler’s Veto Message to 
the Senate on August 16, 1841, vetoing a bill to incorporate the Fiscal Bank of the United 
States); id. at 68 (relaying John Tyler’s Veto Message to the House of Representatives on 
September 9, 1841, vetoing the Fiscal Incorporation Bill); id. at 180 (relaying Veto Mes-
sage of June 29, 1842, vetoing a bill to extend for a limited time the present laws for lay-
ing and collecting duties on imports); id. at 183 (relaying Veto Message of August 9, 1842, 
vetoing a bill to provide revenue from imports); id. at 366 (relaying Veto Message of Feb-
ruary 20, 1845, vetoing a bill relating to revenue cutters and steamers); 39 JOURNAL OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 140–43 (D.C., Blair & Rives 1844) 
(relaying Veto Message of June 11, 1844, vetoing a bill to make improvements of harbors 
and rivers).  Congress’s subsequent override of the latter veto was the first time that it had 
overridden a presidential veto. 
 45 See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 46 WHITE, supra note 28, at 86 (quoting Frank G. Carpenter, A Talk with a President’s Son, 41 
LIPPINCOTT'S MONTHLY MAG. 416, 418 (1888)) (relating John Tyler’s informing his Cabi-
net members that he will accept their resignations if they choose not to carry out his pre-
scribed measures). 
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Thus, in the first meeting with his Cabinet, Tyler twice rejected 
following the Whigs’ preferred practices of a President’s deferring to 
his Cabinet and acquiescing to its views.  Moreover, he not only re-
jected the Cabinet’s advice that he sign the Fiscal Corporation bill 
but also gladly accepted the mass resignation of the Cabinet (except 
for Webster) to protest his veto of that bill.47  Tyler quickly nominated 
five people who would be loyal to him, not to the Whig elite.48  Al-
though Clay hoped to stall the nominations because Tyler had not 
consulted with him, the Senate confirmed them all in record time.  
While there were subsequent shifts in the Cabinet’s composition, Ty-
ler never wavered on his conception of the Cabinet.  He only con-
sulted it when he saw fit and only followed its counsel when it ac-
corded with his own views. 
Tyler’s refusal to consult with congressional leadership on his cab-
inet nominations was not unique.  Throughout his presidency, Tyler 
rejected the Whig principle that he should consult with the congres-
sional leadership on all his nominations, and instead strongly de-
fended his prerogative as President to exercise his nominating au-
thority as he saw fit.  In spite of fierce, persistent opposition in the 
Senate, Tyler established several significant precedents bolstering the 
President’s independent, unilateral authority to make nominations to 
confirmable offices as he saw fit. 
First, Tyler made the significant decision, after his expulsion from 
the Whig Party, to use patronage to ensure loyalty to his policies 
throughout his administration and to build support for a run for the 
presidency in 1844.  Indeed, in his nearly four years in office, Tyler 
remade his Cabinet more than once, and his efforts to reconstruct a 
Cabinet to meet his shifting political fortunes and needs were his-
toric:  twenty-one different people filled the six different posts during 
Tyler’s presidency, the largest number of cabinet appointments made 
by a single President until Ulysses Grant (who made twenty-five cabi-
net appointments over the course of two full terms to fill seven cabi-
net offices).  Including the cabinet secretaries that Tyler had inher-
ited from Harrison, there were three Secretaries of State (including 
Daniel Webster at the beginning and John Calhoun at the end of his 
administration), four Secretaries of War, four Treasury Secretaries, 
 
 47 See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 72–86 (describing the turmoil within Tyler’s Cabinet fol-
lowing his vetos, and the subsequent resignation of many cabinet members). 
 48 Id. at 87 (describing Tyler’s quick nomination of cabinet members who would be loyal to 
him). 
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three Attorneys General, two Postmasters General, and five Navy Sec-
retaries.49 
In response to Senate opposition to his efforts to assert his nomi-
nating authority independently, Tyler turned to his recess appoint-
ment authority.  With the counsel of Hugh Legare, his widely re-
spected, second Attorney General, Tyler asserted that he could use 
his recess appointment authority to make recess appointments at any 
time because of the “overruling necessity” of the President’s constitu-
tional responsibility of exercising “the whole executive power” “per-
petual[ly]” and with “no interruption” by the Congress.50  Hence, Ty-
ler justified his making recourse to his recess appointment authority 
whenever, in his judgment, Congress had gone too far (and too long) 
in obstructing his efforts to fill a vacancy. 
Tyler’s broad construction of his power to nominate whom he 
pleased and to make recess appointments when he felt necessary in-
cluded his resistance (and vigorous protests) against efforts by the 
House to encroach upon his appointment power.  On March 16, 
1842, the House approved a resolution requesting that  
[T]he President of the United States and the heads of the several Depart-
ments be requested to communicate to the House of Representatives the 
names of such of the members (if any) of the  Twenty-sixth and Twenty-
seventh Congress who have been applicants for office, and for what offices, 
distinguishing between those who have applied in person, and those whose 
applications were made by friends, whether in person or by writing.51 
A week later, Tyler submitted to the House a formal Protest in 
which he explained that his refusal to comply with the resolution on 
the grounds that, among other things, “compliance with the resolu-
tion . . . would be a surrender of duties and powers which the Consti-
tution has conferred exclusively on the Executive.”52  He explained 
that  
 
 49 See generally id. at 146.  Of the twenty-one different people who served in Tyler’s Cabinet, 
thirteen were Whigs and eight were Democrats.  But, at least some turnover was not the 
fault of either Tyler or the Congress.  In February 1844, Tyler and several dignitaries were 
present at a demonstration of the unveiling of the U.S.S. Princeton’s new weapon, which 
was then supposed to be the largest naval gun.  On the third discharge, the weapon ex-
ploded at the breech and killed several of the spectators, including Tyler’s Secretary of 
State and Navy Secretary. 
 50 Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673, 675–76 (1841) (describing the 
power of the President to fill vacancies that may happen during the recess of Senate). 
 51 See 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 105 (describing John Tyler’s refusal to comply with 
the House of Representatives’ request that the President provide correspondence with 
the House regarding members of the 26th and 27th Congresses). 
 52 Id at 106. 
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The appointing power, so far as it is bestowed on the President by the Con-
stitution, is conferred without reserve or qualification.  The reason for the 
appointment and the responsibility of the appointment, rest with [the Presi-
dent] alone.  I can not perceive anywhere in the Constitution . . . any right 
conferred on the House . . . to hear the reasons which an applicant may urge 
for an appointment to office under the executive department, or any duty 
resting upon the House . . . by which it may become responsible for any such 
appointment.53 
Tyler’s defense of the President’s authority to keep the House from 
encroaching upon (or even inquiring into) the domain of his ap-
pointment authority was no different than Jackson’s before him or 
Polk’s afterwards. 
Tyler’s next assault on the Whig conception of the presidency was 
his decision, like that of Harrison before him, to support rather than 
to oppose the principle of rotation in office.  Indeed, Tyler moved 
quickly, once he became President, to replace disloyal officials with 
those who were personally loyal to him; this practice merely intensi-
fied—rather than initiated—once he was expelled from the Whig 
Party.  In 1841 alone, Tyler and Harrison removed over 300 offi-
cials—the most in any single year in the Antebellum era except for 
Jackson’s first year in office.54  Bolstering Tyler’s construction of his 
removal authority were several official opinions of Attorney General 
Legare that would influence subsequent thinking and practice per-
taining to the President’s removal power.55 
Tyler struck yet another blow to the Whig orthodoxy on the presi-
dency when he rejected the party’s basic tenet that a President should 
serve for only a single term.  Once Tyler came into office, he point-
edly did not pledge, as Whig leaders believed a President should, to 
serve only a single term in office.  His silence, coupled with the fact 
that by 1842 Tyler was plainly employing his appointment and re-
moval powers to support a run for the presidency in 1844,56 ended 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 150 (1904) (describing the 
sweep of removals from office that occurred in 1841). 
 55 See Power of President to Fill Vacancies, supra note 50 (describing the power of the Presi-
dent to fill vacancies that may happen during the recess of Senate); 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1–
2 (1842) (opining on the military power of the President to dismiss from service); see also 
Appointment and Removal of Inspectors of Customs, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 165, 166 (1843) 
(suggesting that “in a proper case” a cabinet secretary “has the authority and discretion 
[to reject any officer without the consent of the collector] until his power in this particu-
lar be expressly restrained by act of Congress”). 
 56 See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 168, 174–76 (describing Tyler’s strategic cabinet staffing 
to support his future presidential run). 
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any doubt about Tyler’s refusal to abide by the Whig commitment to 
a limited presidential term. 
Tyler’s final blow to the Whig conception of the presidency was 
his refusal to defer, at least routinely, to resolutions passed by the 
House and the Senate throughout his presidency that demanded that 
he turn over to one or the other particular documents or information 
that were in either his or the executive branch’s possession.  More of-
ten than not, he complied with the resolutions,57 but on three occa-
sions he submitted for publication in the congressional record his 
reasons for refusing to comply with particular document requests 
from the House.58 
It is, however, significant that Congress attempted to retaliate 
against each of the blows that Tyler struck against the Whig concep-
tion of the presidency.  First, in response to Tyler’s vetoes of legisla-
tion in June and August of 1842, the House appointed a special 
committee to investigate whether President Tyler had committed an 
impeachable offense.59  The resolution to appoint the committee was 
in fact the first request to initiate a presidential impeachment to be 
formally introduced in the House.  In early August, the House re-
ferred Tyler’s message to the special committee that Clay’s close 
friend, the Speaker of the House, John White, appointed, and whose 
members included not only John Quincy Adams as chair but also the 
man who had introduced the impeachment resolution against Tyler, 
John Botts.  A week later, the select committee issued a report that 
harshly criticized Tyler’s actions, particularly his vetoes of the two 
bills attempting to re-charter a national bank, for the “gross abuse of 
constitutional power, and bold assumptions of powers never vested in 
him by any law”; for “depriv[ing] the people of self-government”; for 
 
 57 Two examples are the House’s and Senate’s respective resolutions requesting Tyler to 
identify the officials whom he had removed from office.  Notably, then-Senator James Bu-
chanan sponsored the resolution that the Senate approved, while the House approved an 
identical resolution on July 16, 1841.  Tyler did not resist either of these resolutions, since 
he construed them as merely requesting information that was already public—namely, 
the names of officials who had been removed and were no longer in office. 
 58 See Letter from President John Tyler to the House of Representatives (Feb. 26, 1842), in 
37 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 447 (D.C., Gales 
& Seaton 1841) (detailing the Blair & Rives legislation); President John Tyler, Protest to 
the House of Representatives (Mar. 23, 1842), in 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 105 
(describing his refusal to comply with the House of Representatives’ request that the 
President provide correspondence with the House regarding members of the 26th and 
27th Congresses); President John Tyler, Special Message (Jan. 31, 1843), in 4 
RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 220 (submitting a report from the War Department in 
compliance with the House resolution requesting communication to certain queries). 
 59 See generally PETERSON, supra note 27, at 101–07 (describing the events leading to the for-
mation of the House special committee and its report criticizing President Tyler). 
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“assum[ing] . . . the whole legislative power to himself, 
and . . . levying millions of money upon the people, without any au-
thority of law”; and for the “abusive exercise of the constitutional 
power of the President to arrest the actions of Congress upon meas-
ures vital to the welfare of the people.”60  Significantly, the report 
found that although Tyler’s actions justified the invocation of the 
federal impeachment process, it did not recommend impeachment 
because “in the present condition of public affairs, [it would] prove 
abortive.” 61  Furthermore, the report was not unanimous:  Represen-
tatives Charles Ingersoll of Pennsylvania and James Roosevelt of New 
York, both Democrats, issued a minority report that defended Tyler, 
and Thomas Gilmer, a Virginia Whig who remained loyal to Tyler, 
went further to submit a counter-report.62  Ingersoll and Roosevelt 
defended the President’s authority to veto bills on any ground he 
deemed appropriate, while Gilmer accused the House of violating 
tradition and the spirit of the Constitution by referring Tyler’s veto to 
a committee, instead of, as the Constitution specified, entering “the 
objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider [the 
bill].” 63  Gilmer told the House that the Constitution did not make 
the President’s veto absolute but specified that it could be overridden 
if there was adequate support in the House and Senate.64  Meanwhile, 
Senator James Buchanan took to the floor of the Senate to defend 
the legality of Tyler’s actions.  After virtually no discussion, the 
House, on August 17, 1842, approved and adopted the report by a 
vote of 100-80.65  This vote marked the first time that the House had 
censured—or formally approved a resolution that was critical of—a 
President.  On August 30, 1842, Tyler delivered a formal Protest to 
 
 60 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 894–96 (1842) (quoting the select committee’s re-
port). 
 61 Id. at 896. 
 62 Near the end of his administration, Tyler selected Gilmer, a former Virginia Governor, to 
serve as Secretary of the Navy.  Shortly after receiving the appointment, Gilmer was killed 
in the tragic misfiring of a new cannon on the U.S.S. Princeton.  See supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 63 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 896 (1842). 
 64 See id. at 896–99 (quoting Gilmer’s report discussing how Congress could proceed in 
overriding the President’s veto); see also CARLTON JACKSON, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES 1792–
1945, at 71–72 (1967) (describing Gilmer’s protest and counter report). 
 65 See House Vote on the Report of the Select Committee (Aug. 17, 1842), in 37 JOURNAL OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at 1343, 1346–52 
(detailing the House vote on the Select Committee’s report criticizing President Tyler’s 
veto). 
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the House;66 however, citing the Senate’s refusal to publish Jackson’s 
Protest of his censure by the Senate in 1834, the House refused to 
publish Tyler’s protest, which was grounded in the same reasoning 
Jackson had cited in his earlier Protest.67 
Although the House censured Tyler through its adoption of the 
special committee’s critical report of Tyler, the House did not ap-
prove its recommendation of a constitutional amendment to enable 
Congress to override a presidential veto by a simple majority and in 
1843 voted 127-83 to reject the impeachment resolution introduced 
against Tyler.68  The House’s failures to impeach Tyler and to approve 
amending the President’s veto authority constitute significant prece-
dents that seem to validate Tyler’s construction of presidential pre-
rogatives. 
Second, the Senate used its Advice and Consent power to retaliate 
against Tyler’s exercises of his appointment authorities.  In Tyler’s 
nearly four years as the President, the Senate rejected seven of his 
twenty cabinet nominations—the largest number of cabinet nomina-
tions ever made by a single President to be rejected by the Senate.69  
In Tyler’s last two years in office, the Senate blocked a majority of his 
nominations (including four cabinet and two minister nominations), 
rejected each of his three nominations of Henry Wise to be Minister 
to France each time by an increasing margin, rejected by increasing 
margins each of the three times that Tyler nominated Caleb Cushing 
as Treasury Secretary,70 and rejected eight of Tyler’s nine nomina-
tions to fill two vacancies on the Supreme Court71—the largest num-
ber of unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations ever made by a sin-
gle President. 72 
 
 66 See President Tyler, Protest to the House of Representatives, (Aug. 30, 1842), in 4 
RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 190–93 (delivering a Protest in response to the August 17, 
1842 bill). 
 67 See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 
1833–1845, at 152–59 (1984) (describing Andrew Jackson’s Protest to the Senate and sub-
sequent reactions). 
 68 See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 106, 109 (noting that the House’s vote to override Tyler’s 
veto failed). 
 69 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS:  A HISTORICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 56, 106 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 70 Id. at 163, 164. 
 71 Id. at 56, 106. 
 72 In fact, Tyler nominated five different people to fill the two vacancies, only one of whom 
the Senate confirmed.  But, because he nominated several of the people more than once, 
he ultimately made nine nominations, only one of which the Senate approved. 
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None of the rejections had anything to do with the nominees’ 
credentials, which were generally quite good.73  Instead, the opposi-
tion arose primarily to keep one if not both vacancies unfilled so that 
the incoming President, James Polk, could fill them.  Mindful of the 
reasons for the opposition, Tyler shrewdly chose as his last nominee 
to fill one of the vacancies the universally respected Samuel Nelson, 
the Democratic Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court.  De-
mocrats in the Senate figured the new President could do no better, 
while Whigs quickly figured that Nelson was bound to be much more 
agreeable to them than any of the people whom they thought Polk 
was likely to nominate.  On February 14, 1845, the Senate approved 
the nomination by voice vote.  Although the Senate’s obstruction of 
Tyler’s efforts to fill both seats during the lame duck session of Con-
gress in 1844–1845 is one of the first, clearest instances of the prac-
tice, now well-established, to stall such nominations in an election 
year, Tyler’s successful nomination of Samuel Nelson to the Court il-
lustrates the power that the Constitution vests even in a weak Presi-
dent, the power to forge compromises—or to build bridges between 
the parties—through the exercise of the nominating authority.  The 
Constitution neither requires nor prohibits a President to avoid con-
flict, or to achieve consensus, through his exercise of his nominating 
authority.  With his successful nomination of Nelson to the Court, Ty-
ler became the first President to reach across the aisle to nominate 
someone from the opposition party to the Supreme Court.  His suc-
cess was not lost on subsequent Presidents, even more popular ones, 
who were interested in attaining bipartisan consensus on their ap-
pointments to the Court.74 
C.  Zachary Taylor 
Over the course of the next eight years, the Whig conception of 
the presidency took a pounding from which it never recovered.  In 
the first four of those eight years, James Polk, a Democrat, modeled 
himself on the antithesis of the Whig conception of the presidency:  
 
 73 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:  A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS 
TO THE SUPREME COURT 105–06 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the credentials of Tyler’s Su-
preme Court nominees). 
 74 In fact, Abraham Lincoln would be the first of ten Presidents to follow Tyler’s example in 
nominating someone from outside his party to the Supreme Court.  The other Presidents 
to do this were Benjamin Harrison, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Warren 
Harding, Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and 
Richard Nixon. 
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Andrew Jackson.75  The election of another Whig President, Zachary 
Taylor, in 1848, renewed the hopes of the Whig Party that its concep-
tion of the presidency might finally be realized.  But, Taylor quickly 
dashed these hopes.  First, and most importantly, in his first—and on-
ly—annual message, Taylor laid out the single, boldest proposal of his 
administration—allowing Congress to vote separately on the admis-
sions of California and New Mexico as new states into the Union.76 
Taylor’s plan was bold for at least two reasons.  First, he did not 
defer to what congressional leaders wanted to do on the admission of 
new states into the Union.  Instead, he asserted his authority as Presi-
dent to call upon Congress to defer to his proposal and thus to con-
sider separately the applications of California and New Mexico for 
statehood.  While most members of Congress either opposed or fa-
vored not voting on Taylor’s plan, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton, a Democrat, vigorously defended Taylor’s plan as closely ad-
hering to the historical practice of unconditionally admitting new 
states.  In response to demands that the admission of new states be 
conditioned on their acceptance of slavery, Benton proclaimed on 
the Senate floor that  
[D]uring the sixty years in which we have been admitting new States into the 
Union, there had been no example of combining any other subject with the 
question of the admission of a State . . . . I deem it a very material thing, as it 
is proposed that we should now commence with doing by a new State what is 
without precedent in the annals of legislation, and which many feel to be a 
deep indignity to that State, that I shall, by reference to the cases of admis-
sion of new States, show that such a thing has never been done before.77 
Moreover, it was widely understood that Taylor’s plan of admitting 
California and New Mexico as new states would dramatically tip the 
balance of power in the Senate (and thus the Union) in favor of anti-
slavery forces.78  While Taylor believed that his proposal had the ad-
vantage of avoiding a debate in Congress over the regulation of slav-
ery in the territories, it upset members of Congress who believed it 
was their prerogative to decide whether or not (as well as the extent 
of their power) to regulate California and New Mexico as territories.  
While Taylor construed the Constitution as not requiring Congress to 
 
 75 See generally JOHN SEIGENTHALER, JAMES K. POLK (2004). 
 76 See President Zachary Taylor, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1849), in 5 RICHARDSON, su-
pra note 41, at 18–19. 
 77 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1850). 
 78 See id. at 358–59 (noting Rep. Henry Washington Hilliard’s speech regarding the gov-
ernment of the territory acquired from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 
the impact on the South if California and New Mexico were admitted as new states). 
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allow—or disallow—the extension of slavery into the territories, he 
believed that a fight in Congress over its extension into the territories 
risked disrupting the Union.  He further believed his plan had the 
advantage of respecting popular sovereignty (in following the will of 
the people of California and New Mexico), a principle that would be-
come the central tenet of the Democratic Party in the years to come.  
Taylor knew his plan would be controversial, but urged that “we 
should abstain from the introduction of those exciting topics of a sec-
tional character which have hitherto produced painful apprehension 
in the public mind; and I repeat the solemn warning of the first and 
most illustrious of my predecessors against furnishing ‘any ground for 
characterizing parties by geographic discriminations.’”79  Taylor’s re-
solve to stand by his plan proved “unconquerable”80 as its merits and 
constitutionality were debated in Congress without end until he died 
unexpectedly from cholera on July 9, 1850.  His proposal had an-
gered virtually every contingency in Congress but the northern 
Whigs.  These Whigs reluctantly accepted Taylor’s abandonment of 
the Whigs’ conception of a weak presidency in exchange for his tak-
ing a position that actually fortified their opposition to the spread of 
slavery and their support for the Wilmot Proviso, which the House of 
Representatives had passed in 1847 and 1848 and which outlawed sla-
very in any federal territory to be acquired from Mexico (but exclud-
ing Texas which had been acquired before the Proviso’s passage).81  
When Taylor in special messages of January 21 and January 23, 1850, 
defended his plan to Congress,82 it was not lost on anyone that he ac-
cepted in passing the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso. 
Taylor’s second rejection of the Whig orthodoxy on the presi-
dency arose in conjunction with his plan for the statehood of New 
Mexico.  Encouraged by Taylor, New Mexico, still under a military 
governor, had made application for immediate statehood not only 
under an anti-slavery constitution but also with an eastern boundary 
 
 79 Taylor, supra note 76, at 19. 
 80 ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR AND MILLARD FILLMORE 121 
(1988). 
 81 See generally HOLT, supra note 25, at 266–83 (discussing Taylor and the Wilmot Proviso). 
 82 See President Zachary Taylor, Message to the Senate (Jan. 23, 1850), in 5 RICHARDSON, 
supra note 41, at 26–30 (arguing for the admission of California and New Mexico as 
states); see also Letter from Robert Toombs to John Crittenden (Apr. 23, 1850), in ULRICH 
BONNELL PHILLIPS, THE LIFE OF ROBERT TOOMBS 65–66 (1913) (“When I came to Wash-
ington, as I expected, I found the whole Whig party expecting to pass the Proviso, and 
that Taylor would not veto . . . . I saw Genl. T. and talked fully with him upon the subject, 
and while he stated he had given and would give no pledges either way about the Proviso, 
he gave me clearly to understand that if it was passed he would sign it.”). 
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that Texas refused to accept.  Indeed, no sooner had Taylor an-
nounced the plan than Texas authorities threatened to acquire, by 
force if necessary, all the New Mexico territory east of the Rio 
Grande, including Santa Fe.83  Texas authorities apparently were pre-
paring to fight in order to extend the domain of slavery.  If the 
United States decided to intervene militarily to stop Texas, it was 
likely a civil war would ensue.  Nevertheless, Taylor, upon learning 
that Texas might invade New Mexico, ordered federal troops to go to 
Santa Fe.  He directed the colonel in charge to prepare his troops to 
rebuff any invasion of New Mexico.84  The federal troops garrisoned 
in Santa Fe kept the Texas forces at bay, and a stalemate ensued that 
was not broken until after Taylor’s death on July 9. 
Taylor’s decision to send troops to thwart the threatened invasion 
of New Mexico had enormous significance for the presidency.  For 
Taylor had not turned to Congress for any special authorization to 
order federal troops to Santa Fe.  We have no documents that spell 
out his thinking on the subject.  Instead, we must infer his likely rea-
soning from the actions he took, and it is possible to identify four 
constitutional grounds to support his unilaterally ordering federal 
troops to New Mexico.  The first was it was consistent with his duty as 
President of the United States to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.”85  In this circumstance, the law he could have claimed 
to have been trying to preserve had not yet been enacted—the bills 
for admission of California and New Mexico as states.  Yet, it is possi-
ble he might have thought that his authority as President to enforce 
the laws faithfully empowered him to do whatever he felt was neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the lawmaking process in Congress.  
Second, Taylor’s ordering federal troops to protect New Mexico was 
consistent with a belief that as the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States the President has unique, constitutional authority to put down 
 
 83 See K. JACK BAUER, ZACHARY TAYLOR:  SOLDIER, PLANTER, STATESMAN OF THE OLD 
SOUTHWEST 294 (1985) (detailing Texas’s efforts to reclaim her territory). 
 84 There is no executive order on record in which Taylor officially ordered federal troops to 
thwart a Texas invasion into New Mexico.  There is, however, correspondence and mem-
oirs from the period—or later—confirming the series of steps Taylor took to defend New 
Mexico as a “possession of the United States” against invasion by one of the United States.  
See, e.g., Letter from General A. Pleasanton to Thurlow Weed (Sept. 22, 1876), in 2 
THURLOW WEED BARNES, LIFE OF THURLOW WEED 180–81 (1970) (recounting a conversa-
tion with Taylor in which Taylor reportedly told Pleasanton that, “I am glad you are going 
to New Mexico.  I want officers of judgment and experience there.  These southern men 
in Congress are trying to bring on civil war. . . . Tell Colonel Monroe . . . he has my entire 
confidence, and if he has not force enough out there to support him . . . I will be with you 
myself. . . .”). 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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a rebellion, and he might have viewed the threats made by Texas as 
Texas threatening a rebellion against the authority of the United 
States and the integrity (and boundaries) of the prospective State of 
New Mexico.  Third, Taylor’s actions were consistent with the belief 
that the Constitution barred a state from interfering with, or under-
mining, a federal instrumentality, including federal territory.  New 
Mexico was federal territory—it belonged to the United States—and 
he believed that no state could invade a territory of the United States.  
Fourth, Taylor might have believed that in ordering federal troops, 
even without special congressional authorization, he was acting both 
to avert a civil war and to keep the Union intact.  At least one promi-
nent historian has intimated that had Taylor lived, his willingness to 
use federal force to stop an invasion of New Mexico might have pre-
cipitated a civil war.86 
The third example of Taylor’s rejection of the Whig conception of 
a weak presidency was the way in which he used his Cabinet.  Con-
trary to Whig philosophy, he refused to allow the Whig leadership to 
dictate his cabinet appointments.87  Hence, his Cabinet had no one 
representing either the northeastern part of the country or the most 
progressive wing of the Whig party.  Instead, his Cabinet consisted 
entirely of men who were personally loyal to him.  In making these 
and other appointments, Taylor primarily followed his own counsel 
rather than that of the Whig leadership, which responded by block-
ing or rejecting most of his nominations to executive offices.88  In-
deed, the very fact that Taylor chose not to abdicate his nominating 
authority to influential Senators in exchange for their favors is fur-
ther evidence of his rejection of the Whig conception of the presi-
dency. 
Moreover, Taylor, like Tyler before him, construed his recess ap-
pointment authority broadly to allow him to make temporary ap-
pointments to any offices that, for whatever reason, had not been 
filled by the time of a recess (understood to be the then-lengthy pe-
riod in between sessions).  In fact, Taylor made 428 recess appoint-
ments.89 
 
 86 See 1 ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 334 (1947) (predicting a schism between 
Northern and Southern Whigs that might have resulted if Taylor had lived). 
 87 See generally BAUER, supra note 83, at 249–62 (describing the process by which Taylor as-
sembled his Cabinet). 
 88 See HOLT, supra note 25, at 421 (describing the mechanisms utilized by the Whig leader-
ship to delay Taylor’s appointments). 
 89 See Carl Russell Fish, Removal of Officials by the Presidents of the United States, in 1 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1899, at 78 (1900) (il-
lustrating removals and appointments under Taylor). 
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Taylor’s views on his removal authority were also antithetical to 
the Whig conception of the presidency.  Interestingly, both Whigs 
and Democrats largely did not dispute Taylor’s constitutional author-
ity to replace Polk’s Cabinet with choices of his own.90  Taylor’s re-
markable, unilateral decision to remove nearly two thirds of Polk’s 
appointees during his first (and only full) year in office91 provoked 
some debate in Congress but ultimately no other response. 
Taylor went further to contemplate replacing most of his Cabi-
net.92  In fact, he intensified the effort in response to the biggest 
scandal of his administration.  The scandal resulted from an official 
decision made by Taylor’s Attorney General to authorize Taylor’s 
Treasury Secretary to pay the full amount of the interest on a claim 
against the United States dating back to 1773.93  When it became 
known that the interest was five times the size of the principal and 
that half of the principal and half of the interest were to go to Tay-
lor’s War Secretary, George Crawford, for his legal services on behalf 
of the claimants, a public outcry arose.  The matter festered for 
months, while the House considered censuring the three members of 
Taylor’s Cabinet involved in the scandal and Taylor mused about the 
necessity of firing his entire Cabinet in order to remove any appear-
ances of corruption within his administration.94  The only other Pres-
ident before Taylor to have removed his entire Cabinet had been 
Andrew Jackson,95 who had been the antithesis of the Whig concep-
tion of the presidency. 
 
 90 In fact, Whigs were eager for Taylor to remove as many Democrats from federal offices as 
possible to make the spots available to Whigs.  See HOLT, supra note 25, at 418. 
 91 See SMITH, supra note 80, at 66 (detailing several of Taylor’s cabinet appointments among 
the different factions of the Whig party). 
 92 See generally NEVINS, supra note 86, at 324–27 (examining the repurcussions in the Cabinet 
following the Galphin scandal). 
 93 See Allowance of Interest on Claims, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 227–28 (1850) (ordering that 
interest be paid to George Galphin on his claim against the United States). 
 94 See NEVINS, supra note 86, at 324–27; see also BAUER, supra note 83, at 312 (discussing any 
potential wrongdoing in the interest payment to Galphin). 
 95 See Andrew Jackson, Protest to the Senate (Apr. 15, 1834), in 3 RICHARDSON, supra note 
41, at 73 (arguing, inter alia, that “neither the President nor any other officer can be 
rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate except in the cas-
es and under the forms prescribed by the Constitution”); id. at 76 (“If the House of Rep-
resentatives shall be of opinion that there is just ground for the censure pronounced 
upon the President, then will it be the solemn duty of that House to prefer the proper ac-
cusation and to cause him to be brought to trial by the constitutional tribunal.”). 
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D.  Millard Fillmore 
Taylor’s death made Millard Fillmore, as ardent a Whig as there 
ever was, the President of the United States.  But, over the course of 
his thirty-three months as President, Fillmore often rejected the Whig 
conception of the presidency.  First, he took the initiative in helping 
to steer the passage of the Compromise of 1850 in Congress.  The 
Whig conception of the presidency would have required Fillmore to 
sign the bill, which he did, but it had never countenanced a Presi-
dent’s taking a leadership role and in his using all of his other pow-
ers, as Fillmore did, to push the controversial bill through the Con-
gress.96 
Second, Fillmore, like Jackson and Polk before him, vigorously de-
fended the principle of rotation in office.  On his second day in of-
fice, Fillmore became the first President to accept the resignation of 
his entire Cabinet.97  Although he asked the cabinet members to stay 
for a month while he reorganized his government, they all left within 
a week of his inauguration.  When he came into office, Fillmore also 
“gave directions that the dissident wing of the Whigs [in his admini-
stration] should be turned out in favor of ‘real’ Whigs.”98  Webster 
alone was responsible for helping Taylor to remove 60% of the politi-
cal appointees in the State Department.99  By seeking nearly a wide-
scale removal of personnel from within his own party, Fillmore set a 
new standard on removals and helped to entrench the principle of 
rotation in office as a fact of constitutional life. 
Third, Fillmore generally appointed people who were loyal to him 
and to the Compromise.100  An additional criterion for cabinet selec-
tions was a sworn commitment not to become a candidate in the next 
presidential election.  Although Fillmore’s appointment preferences 
were designed to heal the Whig party and to unify support for his pol-
icies within his administration, his purpose was undercut by his pur-
poseful exclusion of Whigs, particularly from the North, who had 
supported the Wilmot Proviso and Taylor.  Moreover, in seeking to 
implement these preferences, he was acting in a decidedly non-
Whiggish manner.  He rejected William Seward’s entreaty that he re-
 
 96 See generally SMITH, supra note 80, at 171–94 (recounting Fillmore’s role in the Compro-
mise of 1850). 
 97 See generally id. at 167–68 (explaining the political motivations behind Fillmore’s cabinet 
appointments). 
 98 WHITE, supra note 28, at 312. 
 99 See ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER:  THE MAN AND HIS TIME 689 (1997) (articulating 
Webster’s influence on President Fillmore’s appointments to the State Department). 
100 See SMITH, supra note 80, at 167–68 (discussing Fillmore’s cabinet appointments). 
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tain Taylor’s Cabinet, and pointedly did not turn to Whig or Democ-
ratic leaders in Congress to advise him on his Cabinet.  Instead, he 
followed his own counsel in appointing Webster as Secretary of State, 
and consulted primarily with Webster and Clay on sub-cabinet ap-
pointments.  The end result was that, whereas Southerners had been 
a majority in Taylor’s Cabinet, they held only three of the seven seats 
in Fillmore’s Cabinet.  The four other seats were all held by North-
erners, though none were agreeable to Northern Whigs like Seward 
or Thurlow Weed.101 
Fillmore followed a similar tact in his one successful Supreme 
Court appointment.102  When Associate Justice Levi Woodbury of New 
Hampshire died in September 1851, Fillmore turned to Webster, but 
notably not other congressional leaders, for advice.  Webster recom-
mended Benjamin Curtis, a faithful Whig who had actually opposed 
the Fugitive Slave Act.  Within the region (and nation), Curtis was 
widely regarded as both a lawyer and scholar.  Although Democrats 
held a majority 35-24 in the Senate, Curtis was quickly confirmed by 
voice vote.103 
But, Fillmore took a different and ultimately unsuccessful tact in 
trying to fill the other vacancy that arose during his presidency.104  
This vacancy arose in the summer of 1852 when Associate Justice 
John McKinley died.  In trying to fill this vacancy, Fillmore accepted, 
as he had with his nomination of Curtis, the practice of trying to fill a 
vacancy with someone from the same circuit as the Justice being re-
placed.  This time, Fillmore made four different nominations to fill 
the position, but all were in vain.  First, he nominated a Whig lawyer, 
Edward Bradford, but the Senate, still led by Democrats but who were 
now eager to keep the vacancy open for the next President to fill, 
quickly tabled the nomination.  Fillmore next tried to take advantage 
of the principle of senatorial courtesy—the Senate’s historic defer-
ence to nominations of one of its own to confirmable offenses.  He 
nominated United States Senator George Badger of North Carolina, 
a Whig whom Fillmore believed would be generally agreeable as not 
 
101 Id. at 168 (describing the geographic and political makeup of Fillmore’s Cabinet). 
102 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 73, at 109–10 (describing the motivations behind the 
Curtis nomination). 
103 Six years later, Curtis resigned from the Court to protest its decision in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).  After leaving the Court, Curtis became one of the na-
tion’s most distinguished appellate advocates.  He argued fifty-four cases before the 
Court, and successfully defended President Andrew Johnson in his Senate impeachment 
trial. 
104 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 73, at 110–11 (detailing Fillmore’s failed attempts to fill 
the McKinley vacancy). 
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overly partisan and as a colleague.  The Senate proved him wrong 
when it postponed any action by a single vote (in a rare instance of 
not complying with senatorial courtesy).  Fillmore’s next nomination 
also tried to take advantage of senatorial courtesy, but this time he 
took the unusual step of nominating a Democrat in an ironically 
Whiggish attempt to defer to the will of a majority of the Senate.  
Though the Senate confirmed his nomination of the newly elected 
Democratic Senator Judah Benjamin of Louisiana, Benjamin de-
clined the appointment.  Running out of time, Fillmore opted to 
nominate Benjamin’s law partner, William Micou, a Whig whom he 
hoped Democrats would find agreeable because of his close associa-
tion with Benjamin.  Again, the Senate proved him wrong, tabling the 
nomination.  With Franklin Pierce’s inauguration only two weeks 
away, Fillmore had run out of time, and the Democrats had success-
fully preserved the vacancy for Pierce to fill.  Fillmore’s failures were 
historic:  he was responsible for the second largest number of failed 
nominations made by a President to fill a single seat, and he had 
helped to establish an informal norm (still extant) in which the Sen-
ate tries to preserve for the next President to fill any vacancy that 
arises in a presidential election year. 
Fourth, Fillmore only consulted his Cabinet when he saw fit.  By 
the time he came into office, Whigs had largely abandoned their 
principle of allowing the Cabinet to determine administration poli-
cies by majority vote.  Indeed, on the most important constitutional 
question to come before him as President—the constitutionality of 
the Fugitive Slave Act, he consulted only with Daniel Webster and his 
Attorney General, John Crittenden.105 
Fillmore’s next rejection of the Whig constitutional philosophy of 
the presidency also occurred within his first month in office.  Al-
though he had signaled in his first message to Congress his (Whig-
gish) willingness to approve the compromise evolving in Congress, 
the first bit of news in the message sent shockwaves around the Capi-
tol and violated the Whig orthodoxy on presidential power.  Without 
consulting with congressional leaders, Fillmore decided to send an 
additional 750 troops to Santa Fe to stop a Texas invasion of New 
Mexico.106  Like Taylor before him, Fillmore did not wait for Congress 
to act, and so there was no law specifically authorizing the President 
 
105 See SMITH, supra note 80, at 200 (discussing Crittenden’s opinion of the constitutionality 
of the Fugitive Slave Act); see also Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Bill, 5 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 254 (1850). 
106 See SMITH, supra note 80, at 168–69 (describing Fillmore’s use of the military in New Mex-
ico). 
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to send troops to New Mexico, even to protect against a threatened 
invasion of United States property.  In not waiting for more specific 
authorization, Fillmore seemed also to be making the larger point 
that the authority at stake was strictly that of the federal government.  
Through his actions and statements, he was emphasizing that a state 
lacked the authority to assert, by force or otherwise, the authority 
vested in the Congress by the Constitution to resolve boundary dis-
putes within the United States. 
Last but not least, Fillmore, with the help of his Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, strenuously opposed the threats of several northern 
states to protest the Fugitive Slave Act and ordered federal troops to 
ensure enforcement of the controversial federal law when it faced re-
sistance in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.107  To support their ac-
tions, Fillmore and Webster delivered extensive, public statements 
against the constitutionality of secession and the need for vigorous, 
uniform enforcement of the law to preserve the Union.108  But, nei-
ther man deferred to congressional leaders in advancing the case for 
presidential action to ensure enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.  
Such initiative further buried the Whig conception of the presidency. 
III.  POSSIBLE LESSONS ON DEPARTMENTALISM 
 
This final Part considers several significant lessons that can be de-
rived from the case study in Part II.  First, the case study shows that 
the Constitution actually matters.  Although it is tempting to think 
that Presidents and members of Congress act strictly in their self-
interest, the case study shows how Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, Fillmore, 
and others actually conformed their actions to what they believed the 
Constitution required or allowed.  Sometimes, they did so against 
their self-interest.  Harrison, Tyler, and Taylor chose to alienate Clay 
in spite of the fact that they would have been better off politically 
with Clay as an ally than an enemy.  Fillmore sacrificed any chance to 
the election to the presidency in his own right by choosing to 
staunchly defend the constitutionality and the need for vigorous, uni-
form enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.  The point is not whether 
one can take issue with their particular constitutional or political 
judgments that they each made but rather that their judgments had 
discernible constitutional consequences. 
 
107 See generally id. at 210–16 (describing Fillmore’s detest of slavery but commitment to en-
forcing the Fugitive Slave Act). 
108 See, e.g., REMINI, supra note 99, at 724–28 (detailing speeches by Fillmore and Webster 
discussing the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act). 
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Second, the case study shows how important role-playing can be in 
the federal government.109  People might conform their behavior re-
garding an office’s powers and limitations once they hold the posi-
tion.  As President, Tyler gravitated toward emulating Jackson in spite 
of the criticism he leveled against Jackson as President, and Fillmore 
as President was willing to compromise his long-held views about the 
Wilmot Proviso to save the Union.110 
Third, the case study shows how the Supreme Court was periph-
eral to, if not completely uninvolved with, the demise of the Whig 
conception of the presidency.  Indeed, neither Congress nor the 
Presidents in the period from 1840 to 1852 turned to the Court to 
decide the fate of the Whig conception of the presidency.  This con-
ception collapsed solely because of what Presidents and members of 
Congress did, not what the Court said or did. 
Fourth, the case study illustrates how departmentalism is a func-
tion of constitutional construction and non-judicial precedent.  On 
the one hand, the Whig conception of the presidency collapsed large-
ly because of both the blows struck against it by Presidents and the 
concomitant failures of Congress to prop it back up.  Moreover, it is 
important to recognize that even as the Whig conception of the pres-
idency was collapsing, congressional power was not receding.  For in-
stance, Tyler and Fillmore each effectively reached an impasse with 
the Senate over Supreme Court appointments that ultimately bol-
stered senatorial power. 
Fifth, the collapse of the Whig conception of the presidency was 
not, and should not, be construed as a vindication of the unitary the-
ory of the executive.  It is true that Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, and Fill-
more each failed to conform to the Whig orthodoxy on the presi-
dency, but their resistance was not grounded on a fully articulated 
endorsement of the unitary theory of the executive as we now know 
it.  Indeed, none of them ever expressly endorsed the theory.  More-
over, sometimes these Presidents took stands that conflicted with this 
theory.  For instance, it does not appear that Tyler or Taylor agreed 
with the notion of an absolute executive privilege, the notion that a 
President has complete, unilateral discretion over what information 
 
109 I owe this insight to Fred Greenstein, Professor Emeritus at Princeton.  Citing the social 
science literature on role-playing, Professor Greenstein suggested, in a conversation on 
April 21, 2009, that the case study is consistent with the social science literature showing 
that a person’s perceptions or actions might depend on where the person is situated in 
the government or the office that he or she occupies. 
110 Cf. SMITH, supra note 80, at 165 (discussing the impetus for Fillmore’s altered stance on 
the Wilmot Proviso). 
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produced in the executive branch to maintain as confidential or to 
disclose.  While such a notion seems consistent with, if not a part of, 
the unitary theory of the executive, Tyler often acquiesced to con-
gressional documents and even produced internal executive branch 
documents without recognizing or claiming to have waived any appli-
cable executive privilege.111  Nor did the Presidents who served from 
1840–1852 expressly support the President’s authority to remove an-
yone exercising executive power anywhere in the government.  Tay-
lor, Tyler, and Fillmore apparently thought they had such authority 
as reflected in their systematic efforts to reorganize their administra-
tions with people who were personally or politically loyal to them and 
not just the Whig Party.  Tyler and Fillmore did replace their Cabi-
nets but only because of the mass resignations of their cabinet offi-
cers rather than the exercise of their removal power.  Harrison actu-
ally endorsed at least some civil service reform which would have put 
some limits on the President’s removal authority,112 and, as Calabresi 
and Yoo point out,113 Congress rejected Tyler’s Exchequer plan and 
presumably with it, the single most extensive endorsement he made 
of the unitary theory of the executive. 
Another important lesson is the limited utility of a given case 
study.  Although I have given a few examples of the blows struck by 
Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, and Fillmore against the Whig conception of 
the presidency and the congressional responses to their respective 
blows, there is more, much more, to the story of the demise of the 
Whig conception of the presidency than I have related.  It is espe-
cially important, in light of the present Symposium, to recognize that 
each of these Presidents sometimes embraced this conception and 
thus rejected or acted contrary to the unitary theory of the executive.  
For instance, Fillmore did not issue a single veto during his tenure as 
President,114 and Tyler, in spite of his aggressive exercises of his veto 
authority on six occasions, signed off on much of the Whigs’ domes-
tic policy agenda during his presidency, including an early bank-
 
111 See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 171 (decribing how Tyler complied with the House, send-
ing its members information concerning an executive investigation of the Cherokee Indi-
ans). 
112 See id. at 39–40 (explaining how Harrison balanced political pressure with his commit-
ment to improving the civil-service system). 
113 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 134 (discussing Tyler’s plan for an an Independent 
Board of Exchequer and its failed enactment). 
114 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 39, 57 (1988). 
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ruptcy law.115  We should not read too much into a single case study, 
whether it be mine or those comprising The Unitary Executive; these 
are all incomplete accounts of departmentalism. 
Last but not least, Matthew Adler is correct when he suggested as 
moderator of our panel that my positive account of departmentalism 
has certain normative consequences.116  One is that it cuts against the 
notion of judicial supremacy.  My case study is a single example of 
departmentalism at work, but it reinforces the point I have made 
elsewhere that judicial supremacy is not a fact of much constitutional 
life.117 
Another normative consequence of my positive account is that it 
suggests the practical impossibility that the unitary theory of the ex-
ecutive could ever be, or will ever be, fully implemented.  The reason 
is simple:  it is because departmentalism, as I have shown, is shaped 
both through internal interactions within a branch and external in-
teractions with the other branches.  The unitary theory of the execu-
tive, in its fullest form, poses a threat to a substantial number of laws 
that Presidents have signed and enforced in the past, by which the 
Congress still stands, and the Supreme Court has upheld.  It is at this 
juncture that the force of precedent, both judicial and non-judicial, 
comes fully into play, for the full and complete implementation of 
the unitary theory of the executive is only possible if the leaders of all 
three branches of the federal government agree—and stick to their 
agreement over time—to abandon over two centuries of non-judicial 
precedents pertaining to presidential and congressional power.  It is 
hard to imagine that the world of checks and balances can be made 
entirely anew to that extent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Unitary Executive is a singular achievement.  It provides excel-
lent case studies of the extent to which each President from Washing-
ton to Bush has recognized or tried to implement the unitary theory 
of the executive. 
But, their account, as rich it is, tells only part of a larger story:  the 
comprehensive history of the development of presidential power over 
 
115 See Richard P. McCormick, William Henry Harrison and John Tyler, in THE PRESIDENTS:  A 
REFERENCE HISTORY 146–47 (Henry F. Graff ed., 2d ed. 1997) (discussing Tyler’s policies 
in office). 
116 I am grateful to Professor Adler for raising this point in the discussion after our panel’s 
presentations. 
117 See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 5. 
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time.  Professors Yoo and Calabresi have given us the perspective of 
Presidents on the unilateral theory of the executive, but every Presi-
dent as well as members of Congress, not to mention the Supreme 
Court, has taken nuanced views of presidential power and often exer-
cise power in contested circumstances.  The history of the interaction 
of the branches, particularly the President and Congress, is a history 
of constitutional construction and the forging of non-judicial prece-
dents, which shape dynamically the exercises of presidential and con-
gressional powers. 
Departmentalism might not work quite as precisely as the princi-
ple in physics that for every action there is a reaction; however, it is a 
function of the interaction of the branches over time.  Presidential 
power does not develop in a vacuum; it has developed not only at the 
expense of congressional power but in concert with the growth of 
congressional power.  We cannot understand one without the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
